After Joschka Fischer's speech by Hatto Fischer (2000)

Europe’s Possibilities

Brussels 20.6.2000

Joschka Fischer’s recent speech held at the Humboldt University in Berlin about reforms in Europe is appreciated because it gives apparently an important impulse to focus again much more on perspectives for Europe. Along with that go efforts to improve at diplomatic level the relationship between Federal Germany and France and to establish the Greens as a ‘European human rights movement’.

What Habermas said at the time of the last federal elections in Germany about Joschka Fischer as being a true European, seems to be fulfilled here. He wishes that the speech is not understood as being given as foreign minister, but at a personal level; equally, by giving his speech at a university he attempts to distance himself from the daily business of politics and power. By necessity he confronts the existing spiritual basis of Europe and reveals an astonishing proximity to a political philosophy. This has not been noticed until now in his political thinking, but seems to relate to the most basic philosophical developments in German history that took place besides Hegel with Kant. With that go many hidden dimensions and assumptions on how to reconstruct European reality.

Naturally such a speech raises the question, whether or not such philosophical principles of the past can be conveyed, if at all, upon the modern Europe as it has emerged after 1945. Considerable doubts are here appropriate even if Habermas introduces Derrida at the Frankfurt University and Derrida gives his recognition to the university as an innovative force free of power. But was it not Habermas who has doubted at least until recently whether or not philosophy can have any impact upon politics, never mind that the Greens had shown anything like a basic political-philosophical attitude towards the question of Europe!

The speech by Joschka Fischer indicates, however, that he is willing to cut out the design for Europe along Kant’s way of thinking, namely schematically limited to institutional reform. It is, therefore, of no surprise, that the response to his speech was mainly positive throughout Europe, even in France, although there the tone of some comments sounded a bit ambivalent. For that there exist some reasons. They are directly connected with how the present problems of Europe are seen and described.

For example, in his article about the European Union under the title “A functionalist puzzle without soul”, Gilbert Ziebura characterizes the European integration process as being stuck in-between the bureaucracy in Brussels and how the member states present themselves in the media at the expense of the Commission. Similar to many other voices, he bemoans the fact that European integration has become a process of deliberation that is no longer understandable to the people. “The events surrounding this process have made integration into something completely detached, without thereby following any clear, coherent concept, that could convince, even inspire people, because it would open for them a perspective of hope.” (Frankfurter Rundschau, 19.June 2000, Nr. 140)

But what would happen if the bemoaned picture of Brussels equals bureaucracy turns out to be but a fallacy? What if this picture is put into circulation only to distract attention away from the inflexible bureaucracies of the member states? What would be the case if proven true, that not only England wishes to continue a national political course at the costs of European integration, but equally also the other member states? There is a real danger in this wish by the member states to sideline the Commission when it comes to shaping European policy. It is not at all sure that this move would bring about at all European integration, lest advance it a bit. There is something about how Joschka Fischer weighs his options when thinking about how to reform Europe that does not seem right. Judging according to his speech, it appears that he is willing to drop the transnational idea of Europe and to see Europe merely as an unification of member states on federal principals alone. In turn, this poses the question whether or not such a proposal would mean regression or progression for Europe. The judgement is relative and underlines the uncertainty about knowing what is the case. Even President Rau emphasizes that given such a concept, there has to be taken into consideration different historical experiences. In brief, the Germans would see in a federal system fore mostly progress, the French rather regression.

In order to elaborate on his basic ideas about Europe, Joschka Fischer bases his speech upon three core points:

-he wants to limit the time horizon of the European integration process by having everyone commit themselves to the ‘finality’

-to achieve that he deems it necessary that the European Parliament is reshaped and hence he searches for a possibility to secure the political representation of the member states at European level through a definite institutional reform

-insofar as he relates to the respective ‘political elite’ in the member states by identifying them as the political subject to realize this goal, he seems to follow a guideline by Habermas who said with regards to Marx, that the theoretical description of reality can only then be fulfilled, if the subject is named that shall introduce this change (in the case of Marx the worker, hence with Joschka Fischer the ‘political elite’ – indicated that the Greens have gone a long way in their emancipation from left wing theory and critical concepts of practice to real exercise of power)

All three aspects taken together offer a promise, namely to look at the future of the integration process in such a way as to give an important impulse to a final conception of Europe. However, the idea of ‘Finality’ requires a cultural horizon, if a wrong kind of dramatization based on final things is to be avoided, while giving all of the initiative to a so-called ‘political elite’ raises the question, but how then can we still proceed towards the democratization of Europe?

Time horizon for Europe

Joschka Fischer admits, what matters to him is to close the debate about Europe and decide about its final form. He thinks it is no longer possible to just continue as has been the case until now. There has to be made finally a decision about Europe’s final form. Finality should determine as a vision for the future all actions from now on.

By admitting, that he prefers finality to any other kind of time horizon for Europe, Joschka Fischer distances himself from the method of doing things as has been characteristic of the European integration process. He wants, thereby, to risk the leap out of practice into the final form. Along with that he hopes that those endless debates without any conclusion can finally be left behind, in order to begin in earnest the actual work for Europe within a sturdy, that is permanent framework.

Problematic in such a proposed final solution is that it will curtail very much the process of democratization in Europe. Instead the integration process would become even more dependent upon such a decision-making mechanism that people can no longer understand and follow what is going on.

However, there is another problem linked to such an urge to end all debates and to get on with more serious things. It is a sign of growing impatience, but if it becomes political, then it can be easily transformed into something like a counter movement against people by excluding them. Yet Europe needs every voice, in order to be able to shape Europe openly. By approaching the question of Europe out of different perspectives, the opinions of people would carry substantial weight.

Ancient Greece has taught that it is no easy task to bring about a just society and therefore measures need to be set for the tasks ahead. Such measures have to consider the time it takes for growing together in relation to what people have lived through in European history. Altogether it would mean consciously having to set own measures that everyone knows and according to which European affairs are judged by. It would include political wisdom’s, different styles of governing and cultural diversity. All of this would have to be recognized prior to implementing the idea of united Europe, while the outcome would be something else than a national house. Thus it would be much more appropriate to talk in public about the time and space needed for coming together peacefully, if Europe is to be filled with democratic life.

Political regression begins once the imagination of the people is no longer related to, but instead speeches become empty due to over institutionalizing everything. That would but destroy the European idea, and in the case of Joschka Fischer, he intensifies that risk by over-dramatizing the fact that everything has to have an end or at least a final form.

By taking recourse to the idea of finality, he drives things further in Europe than anyone else. But as it is impossible to explain the existence of life by taking recourse to death, that is, sense and meaning of life cannot be deduced from the existence of death, it is just as impossible to determine the European integration process by taking recourse to a concept of finality. Goal and means must be mediated with one another, whereby the creation of theory out of practice experiences another dimension as soon as unification is not imposed upon people, but lets them reinforce this process as a wish strengthened by experiences that there is a consensus shared by all.

Therefore, when president Rau of Germany argues, that in the process of European integration “grown identities ought not to be subordinated to coercive rules of harmonization”, he agrees out of wrong reasons with Joschka Fischer’s federal concept for Europe. For it would be then just as consequential not to hinder or to limit the growth of the European identity. That would, however, be the case if the federal principals would be imposed upon Europe as a whole. If the question of identity would be determined solely by member states, it excludes many other kinds of identities in Europe. What would happen to those many children of mixed couples, children who are, for instance, neither Greek nor German, but which would have as Europeans a chance to respect the cultural aspects of both parents and to develop a kind of feeling for identity based on different cultural references?

Even the claim that consideration has to be given to the “grown identities” has to be rejected. After all the history of the Federal Republic of Germany is anything but one of an identity finding process people have grown into. Since 1871 the question of national identity was obligatory resolved in favor of the German state. It meant having to give recognition to the state prior to being able to claim an own identity as a person and to be perceived as such at immediate level. The national identity came first and was created out of negating differences and otherness. It is still meant to prevent the person from developing any other, but the German identity abstractly imposed upon people. Brought about by what Hegel described as part of the political logic following the negation of the negation, it forces every person to take on this national concept even if it means destroying any attachment to a personal identity in the process. Therefore, the claim about grown identities cannot be upheld with regards to national identities. If not outright coercion, then national identities are brought about more often by a contradictory, if not distorted concept of identity. It does not allow the recognition of real history nor of non-identity, but both together would not allow that any single categorical definition of identity can be taken serious (Robert Musil: The Man without Attributes).

European identity means after all people can breathe a sigh of relief to be no longer imprisoned after centuries of being held captivated by the national corset. Consequences of First and Second World War and the extreme forms of nationalism unleashed then are still to be felt today. Hence efforts to strive for an authentic Europe would not be understood, if not interpreted as a wish to get rid of the eternal negation of the other as a human being, if not belonging to the same nation. The recent events in former Yugoslavia with their ethnical cleansing repeat and intensify this absurd drama of state-political strategies wishing to exploit efforts by people to delimit themselves from others for no other purpose then of maintaining power.

If European integration is to succeed, there has to be attained freedom from the coercion to national identity. That means accepting what Adorno says about identity being equally non-identity. As was the case when West Berlin was separated from Federal Germany and the East, mainly East Germany, and managed to exist as a free space under the protection of the four powers, it would be appropriate for Europe to let citizens of all member states be free to explore new possibilities of a common European identity and non-identity as part of their self-finding process. Only then it would be furthermore clear, that coming to terms with the different and various identities in Europe would mean richness and not threat to the own identity. A demand for a single national identity would only favor the right wing radicals, but not an enlightened European.

Of interest is that in the case of West Berlin, negative changes began already in 1981 with the election of Richard von Weizsaecker as mayor of Berlin. At that time the later president of the republic stated, that the youth in West Berlin had due to lack of military service no connection in their identity with the state. He meant an identity as demanded for upholding the state. He concluded that something needed to be undertaken, so that there would not come about an identity building process that deviates from the history of Germany. Perhaps in future historians shall examine more carefully this time period of Berlin West 1945-89 when there existed possibilities to learn out of history, in order to shape the future differently. Since 1981 it was made certainly impossible. Significantly were then the slogans by German citizens of Berlin wishing to know when Kreuzberg would again belong to them (implying the district has been taken over by the Turkish people). The unresolved question about double citizenship, and the campaign started by the Conservatives against that, but also the difficulties Federal Germany has with the simplest recognition of the other as an equal citizen, that points out where some of the dangers lie in terms of an identity finding process.

The tactic of undermining any free identity is worrisome while binding everything within a structure supporting the national state like the Bundeswehr (German army) provokes not only critical thoughts. For it illuminates also the danger of history being repeated because the fathers do not wish that their children grow-up outside of these pre-set norms. That includes ways of using the national language in a certain way. For national identity is not only a single affair for the individual, but within the social space, politically speaking, a question and demand to be recognizable. If that demand would exclude the non-identity, then there would follow but a mere repetition of the familiar because already known. The national demand to have the same identity negates all differences and excludes any kind of differentiation. It would negate also the fact that any identity question is complex and most difficult to resolve. If Europe would give in to but single categories, then in cultural terms it would lead directly towards discriminatory practices, e.g. funds given solely to Flemish artists.

There is to be thought about further prerequisites for Europe. Life long Learning as practical example should preferably accompany the growing into European Citizenship. This would secure that with time and throughout the life of every European everyone shall learn at least three languages, among them a minority one such as Greek, Irish, Catalonian etc., in order to be open in the communication process with other Europeans and their cultures. Of interest in this connection is that 2001 shall be the ‘year of languages’.

Anna Seghers said once, that ‘people without horizon cannot be creative’. This experience that many go through when without any horizon means that they are stuck in a kind of ghetto where poverty prevails between flittering media images and traffic passing by. Out of that quite another concept of time is created. Vincent Van Gogh has captured it in his painting about the bar with waiter and unemployed people sitting around. The waiter appears to be like a butcher of time which the unemployed just waste by sitting in front of their empty glasses. It is a time they no longer experience. By contrast, those having work, find that they have quite a different private life as opposed to their working tempo. Many can no longer deal with the breakage between these two different kinds of worlds. Even Tony Blair experiences after three years in office that the departure for modernity has not freed society from all kinds of failures that any self imposed hectic brings with itself. A just society is in all cases much more difficult to bring about, especially in such a world wishing to have only money and technology with human measurements counting much less than economic success. It is absurd if the stock market breathes a sign of relief once the number of employed people is again on the rise. To govern under such conditions is very difficult, especially if the interests of the financial sector are diametrically opposed to those who are not privileged by the system and therefore suffer all the negative consequences. The general low level of political discussions does not help in this case at all.

Within Europe it is believed that there exists not only a deficit due to the overpowering dynamics of America, but also there is always the talk about an EU depression. The dispiriting nature goes hand in hand with the limited time horizon people have so that they wait only for vacations or else retirement, because they can no longer stand their work and confined livable relationships. They expect no longer any creative impulses out of their work and personal relationships. That may be explained by the fact that in the meantime many old ghettos in Europe have been converted into new ones; the location of the European parliament in both Brussels and Strasbourg underlines only that.

In case that the time horizon of Europe should be decisive, then there has to be taken into consideration above all culture and with it the living rhythm of the people. After all people suffer under the rapid pace of modern life, since merely the arbitrariness of the moment has been intensified and time costs money. That displaces dialogue as integral part of European cultures, but also the feeling for time. The latter is to be experienced both subjectively as well as a historical dimension beside the objective division of time. Nevertheless any solution depends upon society bringing together past, present and future. Due to the wrong pressure by the member states, Europe is loosing its composure and forgets that what Brecht warned off, namely “the one who wishes to be on the fastest path, with certainty shall be on the wrong one”. Joschka Fischer will have to come to terms with the fact, that the finality as negation of time does not make his argumentation any more convincing. Rather such a demand gives in to an easily to be misunderstood drama.

As soon as finality is a declaration, then there is no longer any more time available for further negotiations. Because of the final demand meaning everything has to be decided now on how things are to be continued, then it can come to fatal break-ups of quite different efforts. The war in Kosovo started with the failure of the diplomatic negotiations. The situation was intensified so much so that there existed apparently no other alternative. Only fate decides after such a decision what happens to people who are hit suddenly by a dramatically deteriorated situation. Today, when looking back upon statements made in favor of war, there is left in memory a statement made by Joschka Fischer as foreign minister. For he believed to be able to judge, that this time the Germans are standing for the first time in history on the right side of the war. Forgotten in this intention to be finally on the right side in terms of morality, is that war never knows a right and a wrong side. The wish to be finally morally correct can be interpreted differently, nevertheless it becomes clear that the striving towards some final solution has never brought about the results desired, but on the contrary. That is to say, the idea of finality has brought about in history such fatal consequences. This is due to letting impatience dictate the terms, that retrospectively seen, it would have been much more advisable to leave things alone rather than to impose the negation of all time. By insisting upon some final form, Joschka Fischer risks imposing upon Europe a wrong time schedule.

New shape of the European Parliament

The recommendations by Joschka Fischer to shape anew the European Parliament, that is the second aspect of his speech. He does not want just any kind of representative democracy, but the representation of the national parliaments at European level. Representatives, who have been elected for the national parliaments, should be delegated in future to Brussels.

Joschka Fischer wishes at the same time that member states are represented at European level in a double sense, insofar as his recommendation goes further. He wants either according to the model of the Federal Republic of Germany with its ‘Bundestag’ and ‘Bundesrat’ or else like the American Democracy with its House of Representatives and Senate besides an indirectly elected president, to have in the European Parliament a second chamber. There the national state interests should find the possibility of expressing their opinions, in order to satisfy a federal structure. How concretely this second and upper chamber should look like, here his hints were not concrete enough.

For this reason Heidi Hautula, president of the GREENS in the European Parliament, regrets that Joschka Fischer does not refer to the Committee of Regions – a possible counter-balance to the national state level once it becomes a matter of unique attributes of Europe related to language, culture and social cohesion. At the same time, she finds that in his speech there is missing any relationship to the citizen as such.

A still greater relocation of European affairs to the level of the member states is no solution. But that appears to be exactly the concept of Joschka Fischer. It would merely intensify the already predominant re-nationalization of European policy, which is being implemented currently by Europe as a whole at the cost of the European Commission. It means safeguarding national interests and not only that, for it will have a higher priority than the democratic rebuilding of Europe. There is no attempt to try and find emancipation from such coercive measures as instigated by Bismarck in 1871 (at that time avant-garde of the coercive unification in Europe at national level). If one were to follow the intentions of Joschka Fischer’s proposals, then this would rob Europe of any chance to be enlightened about its own tragic history. It would mean negating the possibility Europe could give once solutions were sought with some political conviction in Europe’s future based on an own constitution.

But prior to any political dispute and decision about a constitution, there needs to be explained the present situation in which the European institutions in Brussels find themselves in. About the current praxis at European level citizens know hardly anything. The existing division into Council, Commission and European Parliament (with double seat in Strasbourg and Brussels) is if at all perceived, then very superficially and partially. The press contributes towards this oversimplification insofar it equates bureaucratization with the Commission, while leaving out consciously the real power of the Council.

Insofar the Council can make its influence felt everywhere, and not only through the ‘intergovernmental conferences’, there can be named already two problems. First of all, the appointments to the Commission are made by the Member States and this practice continues all the way down to even lower levels of appointments for posts within the Commission. This practice is called the national flag setting besides posts. That contradicts the reform intentions of Prodi and Kinnock. They wish to realize a modern management concept without regard for national sensitivities.

Secondly, the relationship of the member states through the Council to Parliament has taken on in the meantime a one-sided dynamic. The Council is of the opinion it can cut short any time it wishes to do so experiences of Parliament. This is especially the case when Parliament tries to gain new competencies and approve a much larger budget then what Council wishes e.g. for Culture 2000. If conflicts remain unresolved both sides enter a conciliation process and then unanimous decisions are needed. In turn, this has led to the demand by the parliament that decision making is simplified to a simple majority vote, in order to make impossible in future that one member state could bloc a decision. Until now Parliament looses out every time. Insofar a game is being played with Parliament around this and other issues, there is created not only confusion in Parliament, but also the Commission has to suffer. Especially after the Santer affair and now under Prodi, it is being pushed ever more aside. This is because the shaping of ideology in Europe gives more attention to the success of the American economy than to the decisive relationship between culture and politics in Europe.

All that is significant on how in future questions of the European budget are resolved. At the present the European parliament has the budgetary control as the symbolic sovereignty of Europe. The process to make this budget become concrete can be described as the search for the legal basis of European actions. Even the Commission experiences this limitation due to sharper financial controls and special management requirements. Where in the past pilot projects especially because of their innovative character could be financed out of other sources, today the increased financial control implies that the responsibilities of the Commission are restricted to outcomes of negotiations about the legal basis for certain framework programs. Here plays the dialogue between Council, Commission and Parliament a decisive role, especially when it is a matter of determining the legal basis for new programs like Culture 2000. Always the principle of Subsidarity has to be observed in order to uphold the small over the large. It is a demand by the member states that their regional and local levels are not put out of function. This is certainly not a federal system taking into consideration the smallest unit capable of undertaking the action, but rather an interwoven network of different interests connected with power politics in modern Europe. Outside that framework nothing else takes place of interest to Europe.

On hand of a practical example, there can be determined the character of the European budgetary system. Until now money was given partly to very innovative programs, at least according to their own claim. They needed to fulfil certain goals and therefore also guidelines drawn up by the Commission, i.e. the structural fund was set up to bring about equality between the different regions in Europe. In such a case due to having the legal basis, organizations within the member states are eligible to make a project proposal and apply for co-funding. Here it is decisive if these proposals can be made directly to the Commission, and if successful in the application, can be implemented in an autonomous way, that is outside the direct control and granting of permission to undertake such a project by the national member states. As a matter of fact the ability to obtain co-funding possibilities for projects is a freedom from predominant power structures in Europe, in order to enter in practice international co-operation existing over and beyond the narrow framework conditions of the national states. From such projects there is always demanded that they fulfil the European dimension. The latter would be the basis of Europe and hence decisive, that the cultural consensus needed for such projects is perceived at Parliamentary level and developed there further as legal framework for future programs.

European projects need to fulfil certain conditions and be accountable to Parliament via the Commission. That differs basically from the budgetary rights in, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany. Within national budgetary competence there does not exist the significance of innovative actions but rather the legal form, in order to satisfy certain social interests. While lawmakers at national level look out for the possibility to create favorable business conditions, European projects differ insofar their outcomes have no legal binding character. They are strictly speaking only recommendations, therefore, co-operations realized freely at European level and above all reflections of the potential consensus around new paths of development.

Although not legally binding, nor replacements for institutionalized decision making processes, nevertheless European projects pose through their outcomes a challenge to current practices. Innovation is in this sense an anticipation of future developments and, therefore, decisive for the freedom to act in-between the law and the free testing of the not yet realized. Any person overseeing this positive contribution by the Commission in terms of initiating such an innovative process, has yet to realize the value of European projects and of co-operation with the Commission.

That is decisive in order to be able to appraise any proposal made to give a new shape to the European Parliament. The strict passing of law at national level is not at all comparable, at least until now, with the European search for ‘good practice’: practice between law and freedom guarantees the contents of any experimental action. That promotes a certain methodology based on monitoring and evaluation. Ideas about Europe are created out of these various European projects. They are based on experiences on how to come to terms with the cultures and value concepts of the partners in the other member states, but these ideas are not the equivalent of a new law. That is important because the democratic content of Europe cannot be understood if no effort is made to relate to the results of all these projects. Unfortunately this European dimension is missing completely in the speech given by Joschka Fischer.

Hence he does not deal with the question, but how should be shaped in future the European budget. Since momentarily deliberations are taking place whether already existing networks deserve further co-funding, or instead the creation of new networks ought to be funded, this underlines that Europe has come to a decisive point. Until now the budget is one that subsidizes everything, hence a highly political one. Along those lines of thinking, European money is really only eligible for the promotion of the new, that is for the creation of new European networks. But after years of receiving continuous subsidies, there exist different generations of networks through which information about Europe reaches the citizens. Whether or not special funding should be made available for these networks, that is a procedural question being discussed right now in Parliament and in the Commission. It poses certain questions on how to implement, for instance, the new program Culture 2000. The priorities for that are not as of yet very clear, but evaluations and experiences do exist in order to guide the decision making process. Special attention is being paid here with regards to differences between authentic and non-substantial partnerships (the latter only created the last day before making the application for co-funding by a program requiring that each project has a minimum number of international partners).

Authentic developments around such questions signify accordingly the cultural and democratic efforts made equally by the Commission and the experienced actors out in the field and within these networks. That it can make a qualitative difference in practice is made clear by these partnerships and networks. The working together depends upon special partnership dynamics.

Briefly said, the Commission is prepared to take these differences into account, in order to go into the future. However, the national inclined member states are making all the efforts to limit this political emancipation of their citizens to be gained in autonomous projects working in the direction of Europe. This explains at the moment the vast difference between those believing in the European Commission and those who are strict opponents especially at national level. Here Joschka Fischer fails to see the difference.

Furthermore if one would follow his recommendations, it would permit that the co-operation between Parliament and Council would suffer unduly by leaving the dominant role of the Council unchallenged or rather by extending the representation of the member states through Council to Parliament altogether. One consequence of this national vested interest is that money continues to flow in definite channels, see agriculture.

European budgetary means cannot be seen as a financial instrument to shape things. They are financial means for projects to be funded only if member states cannot become active by themselves in that area. That is not only relevant for upholding the subsidarity principle, but also for defining the areas where the Commission may become active.

Since the founding of the coal- and steel community, there have taken place considerable changes. For example, by now the Commission has the right to ask each member state to become accountable when not doing enough to combat unemployment. As a consequence the Commission has become something like an umpire for the ‘accountability’ of the member states. However, measures taken remain subject to guidelines that have been decided upon after negotiations between Parliament and Council. All that can change and will in future the more the member states by themselves begin to displace the Commission and thereby burden the European Union with quite another character. Simply said, it would exclude the European self-consciousness and self-understanding that developed since 1945.

Since parliament is connected with the financial sovereignty, the proposal of Joschka Fischer can be easily measured in terms of consequences. If his proposal would be accepted, then the impression would be created that the financial means of the Union come out of the membership dues of the Member States. Parliament would be then something like an ordinary association and the legal basis of responsibility, if at all identifiable, would reside with the member states. But given his concept foreseeing elected members to the national Parliament sitting as well in the lower house of the future European Parliament, while representatives of the national political elite would be in the Upper House, then accountability would be solely to the national states, but not to the citizens of an unified Europe. The latter could not vote directly the representatives that would sit in the European Parliament, hence there would be no direct accountability to the people as to how money would be spend. The basic principle of financial sovereignty would be violated under such circumstances.

If it were to come to further reform intentions, then it would be equally necessary to clarify the income sources of the European Union. Until now the demanded transparency is impossible, since income and expenditures cannot be brought into relation with each other, and therefore the ability of Parliament to calculate the budget is greatly limited. Furthermore, a sign of wastage of European money is that here an unjust redistribution of scarce resources is going on in favor of definite interest groups – alone 44% of the whole budget is given to agriculture. Since these are in turn the voters of the member states, but not of the European Union, that results in such contradiction hindering even further efforts to reform the European Union. The pressure for reforms comes, however, out of the present imbalance in the distribution of power, so that first of all there have to be articulated political ideas on how to overcome all these injustices. This is needed, if adaptation to future trends is to be on time. But because the financial means are fixed, the European Union cannot keep up with the pressures resulting out of the need to link modernization efforts with recent developments at local, regional, European and international level. Thus any further strengthening of the member states would rob Europe of its future chances, but that is exactly what Joschka Fischer has in mind. His speech sounds as if he wishes to propose something without having thought through really the consequences.

Political representation for the ‘political elite’ at European level

Precisely because institutional reform is in his opinion not advancing, and furthermore because Europe seems to lack the will to get things done, Joschka Fischer takes recourse to the concept of the ‘political elite’ of the respective member states. He thinks to find that elite in the national parliaments. This selection of the selection should redefine the European Parliament and give to the entire European integration process a new dynamic.

Such double negation at European level of parliament in need of democratically elected representatives that can reflect the interests of the whole of Europe requires a few explanations, or rather interpretations. It appears if he starts taking recourse to a political elite that this must be the outcome of more than mere resignation, because it comes not only from the German foreign minister, but above all from a politician coming of the GREENS. Naturally he counts himself already as belonging to that elite, despite his background and original political motivation being one of opposition against such far removed political representation from the people themselves.

The crossing over from one to another camp takes place autobiographically, since he wishes to be understood as giving that speech not as foreign minister nor as politician of the GREEN movement, but as the private person Joschka Fischer. If he intends to gain access to the circle of the elite, then he will succeed by all means. Naturally the GREENS would be well advised if they say already now good-bye to their foreign minister, in order not to become themselves victims of this resignation – something already visible during Joschka Fischer’s tour through Africa. However, if the GREENS follow his pursuit of power, then they would commend themselves to a single generation party, that is to be unable to convince following generations of their political key ideas. They would remain alone, among themselves and only of interest to themselves.

But what is needed in future: a political elite or the younger generation? It appears as if the GREENS under Joschka Fischer's influence are not even conscious of the fact that there exists a difference in how they shall present themselves in future. The crisis of democracy is becoming greater every day due to a lack of participation by the citizens, and with it intensifies passivity that like fear lames everything. But all that shall be merely a consequence once such negative developments as proposed by Joschka Fischer are left unchallenged especially within the GREENs themselves. But it will catch up with the GREENS and in case of not contradicting this preference of a ‘political elite’, in order to shape Europe in future, they will no longer experience any authenticity, because the desire to remain in power will terminate in their own political disenfranchisement.

With that closes the circle Adorno had warned about, namely to continue politics in reality as the practice of disenfranchising everybody just to gain the recognition of the power holders. It goes at the costs of political freedom and trust of the people who are indeed quite capable themselves to shape politically their own lives.

Conclusion

If one was to follow the recommendations of Joschka Fischer, then there would be added to the European alienation the national Estrangement because an elite is always something over and above normal people. As such it would be a privileged part of society. They could exist in the newly created ivory towers, but they would not have any democratic legitimization.

Still more difficult to grasp in practical terms is his retraction to something abstractly desired. The federal Europe, as conceived by Joschka Fischer, could only exist if free from the need to come to terms with other identities. In other words, he does not want a Europe based on multi-cultural identities as they form and dissolve themselves daily in the streets of Paris, London or Brussels, that is identities finding the others to be an enrichment in search of their own reasons to exist. His speech is rather an expression of a political attempt to find independent of Europe a solution to the continual identity crisis existing now in Germany since Kant.

Brussels 20.6.2000

Joschka Fischer’s recent speech held at the Humboldt University in Berlin about reforms in Europe is appreciated because it gives apparently an important impulse to efforts wishing to focus again on Europe. Along with those efforts go attempts to improve at diplomatic level the relationship between Federal Germany and France. At the same, Joschka Fischer may want to establish the Greens as a ‘human rights movement’ at European level.

But what would happen if the bemoaned picture of Brussels equals bureaucracy turns out to be but a fallacy? What if this picture is put into circulation only to distract attention away from the inflexible bureaucracies of the member states?What would be the case if proven true, that not only England wishes to continue a national political course at the costs of European integration, but equally also the other member states? There is a real danger in this wish by the member states to sideline the Commission when it comes to shaping European policy. It is not at all sure that this move would bring about at all European integration, lest advance it a bit. There is something about how Joschka Fischer weighs his options when thinking about how to reform Europe that does not seem right. Judging according to his speech, it appears that he is willing to drop the transnational idea of Europe and to see Europe merely as an unification of member states on federal principals alone. In turn, this poses the question whether or not such a proposal would mean regression or progression for Europe. The judgement is relative and underlines the uncertainty about knowing what is the case. Even President Rau emphasizes that given such a concept, there has to be taken into consideration different historical experiences. In brief, the Germans would see in a federal system fore mostly progress, the French rather regression.

In order to elaborate on his basic ideas about Europe, Joschka Fischer bases his speech upon three core points:

-he wants to limit the time horizon of the European integration process by having everyone commit themselves to the ‘finality’
-to achieve that he deems it necessary that the European Parliament is reshaped and hence he searches for a possibility to secure the political representation of the member states at European level through a definite institutional reform
-insofar as he relates to the respective ‘political elite’ in the member states by identifying them as the political subject to realize this goal, he seems to follow a guideline by Habermas who said with regards to Marx, that the theoretical description of reality can only then be fulfilled, if the subject is named that shall introduce this change (in the case of Marx the worker, hence with Joschka Fischer the ‘political elite’ – indicated that the Greens have gone a long way in their emancipation from left wing theory and critical concepts of practice to real exercise of power)

New shape of the European Parliament

A still greater relocation of European affairs to the level of the member states is no solution. But that appears to be exactly the concept of Joschka Fischer. It would merely intensify the already predominant re-nationalization of European policy, which is being implemented currently by Europe as a whole at the cost of the European Commission. It means safeguarding national interests and not only that, for it will have a higher priority than the democratic rebuilding of Europe. There is no attempt to try and find emancipation from such coercive measures as instigated by Bismarck in 1871 (at that time avant-garde of the coercive unification in Europe at national level).If one were to follow the intentions of Joschka Fischer’s proposals, then this would rob Europe of any chance to be enlightened about its own tragic history. It would mean negating the possibility Europe could give once solutions were sought with some political conviction in Europe’s future based on an own constitution.

Political representation for the ‘political elite’ at European level

Conclusion

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After Joschka Fischer's speech by Hatto Fischer (2000)

Europe’s Possibilities